JOHN HANSON Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA; and DOES 1 through 100, Defendants, CASE NO. M128436, SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF MONTEREY, ANSWER OF DEFENDANT CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA

ABSTRACT: In JOHN HANSON Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA; and DOES 1 through 100, Defendants, CASE NO. M128436, SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF MONTEREY, the ANSWER OF DEFENDANT CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA document. filing date August 18, 2014, is embedded; the text is reproduced.
Defendant City of Cannel-by-the-Sea, ("Defendant" or "City'·) hereby responds to the unverified Complaint of Plaintiff John Hanson ("Plaintiff') as follows:
1. Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 431.30, Defendant generally denies each and every allegation set forth in the Complaint.
2. Defendant further alleges the following separate and distinct Affirmative Defenses to the causes of action alleged in the Complaint:

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs Complaint, and every cause of action contained therein, fails to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action.

SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Plaintiffs claims, and each of them, are barred by the applicable statutes of limitation.

THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs claims, and each of them, are barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrine of waiver.

FOURTH AFFIR1v1ATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs claims, and each of them, are barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrine of unclean hands.

FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs claims, and each of them, are barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrine of laches.

SIXTH AFFIRMITIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiff is estopped from asserting any of the claims against Defendant contained in the Complaint by reason of his own acts, omissions, representations and courses of conduct.

SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs claims, and each of them, are barred, in whole or in part, because the actions respecting the subject matters in the Complaint were undertaken in good faith, with the absence of discriminatory and/or malicious intent to injure Plaintiff, and constitute lawful, proper and justified means to further the purpose of engaging in and continuing the City's affairs.

EIGHTH AFFIRMITIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs claims, and each of them, are barred, in whole or in part, as a result of Plaintiffs failure to exhaust his administrative remedies .

NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs claims, and each of them, are barred, in whole or in part, because Defendant has not interfered with any protectable property interest alleged in the Complaint.

TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs claims, and each of them, are barred, in whole or part, because the relief sought would improperly interfere with Defendant's discretionary authority.

ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs claims, and each of them, are subject to setoff, offset, and/or recoupment, including, but not limited to, for moneys paid to Plaintiff that exceeded any amounts to which he was entitled.

TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs claims, and each of them, are barred, in whole or part, because he was an at-will employee of the City.

THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiff's claims, and each of them, are barred, in whole or in pru1, by the privileges and immunities applicable to public agencies.

FOURTEENTH AF'FIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiff's Complaint is barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrine of after-acquired evidence.

FIFTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiff has failed to mitigate his damages, if any, as required by law.

SIXTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

To the extent Plaintiff has suffered physical or mental injuries-including "emotional distress"-because of Defendant's conduct, any such damages suffered by Plaintiff are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board by operation of California Labor Code section 3200 et seq.

SEVENTEENTH AFFIRMATNE DEFENSE

Plaintiff's claims, and each of them, are barred, in whole or in part, because Plaintiff ratified, consented, and/or acquiesced to the conduct about which he now complains.

WHEREFORE, Defendant prays as follow:

1. For entry of judgment in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff;

2. That Plaintiff take nothing by way of his Complaint;

3. That Defendant be awarded costs of suit herein;

4. That Defendant be awarded its attorney fees and costs incurred in defending this suit in accordance with applicable law; and

5. For such other and further relief as this Court may deem just.

DATED: August 18, 2014

STRADLING YOCCA CARLSON & RAUTH

A Professional Corporation

By ______________________

Jeffrey A. Dinkin

Robert D. Dominguez

Attorneys for Defendant City of Carmel-by-the-Sea

Hanson v. City of Carmel Answer of Defendant City of Carmel-By-The-sea

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF MONTEREY
JOHN HANSON Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA; and DOES 1 through 100, Defendants
CASE NO. M128436

ANSWER OF DEFENDANT CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA