JOHN HANSON Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA; and DOES 1 through 100, Defendants, CASE NO. M128436, SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF MONTEREY, ANSWER OF DEFENDANT CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA

ABSTRACT: In JOHN HANSON Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA; and DOES 1 through 100, Defendants, CASE NO. M128436, SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF MONTEREY, the ANSWER OF DEFENDANT CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA document. filing date August 18, 2014, is embedded; the text is reproduced.
Defendant City of Cannel-by-the-Sea, ("Defendant" or "City'·) hereby responds to the unverified Complaint of Plaintiff John Hanson ("Plaintiff') as follows:
1. Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 431.30, Defendant generally denies each and every allegation set forth in the Complaint.
2. Defendant further alleges the following separate and distinct Affirmative Defenses to the causes of action alleged in the Complaint:

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs Complaint, and every cause of action contained therein, fails to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action.

SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Plaintiffs claims, and each of them, are barred by the applicable statutes of limitation.

THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs claims, and each of them, are barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrine of waiver.

FOURTH AFFIR1v1ATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs claims, and each of them, are barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrine of unclean hands.

FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs claims, and each of them, are barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrine of laches.

SIXTH AFFIRMITIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiff is estopped from asserting any of the claims against Defendant contained in the Complaint by reason of his own acts, omissions, representations and courses of conduct.

SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs claims, and each of them, are barred, in whole or in part, because the actions respecting the subject matters in the Complaint were undertaken in good faith, with the absence of discriminatory and/or malicious intent to injure Plaintiff, and constitute lawful, proper and justified means to further the purpose of engaging in and continuing the City's affairs.

EIGHTH AFFIRMITIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs claims, and each of them, are barred, in whole or in part, as a result of Plaintiffs failure to exhaust his administrative remedies .

NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs claims, and each of them, are barred, in whole or in part, because Defendant has not interfered with any protectable property interest alleged in the Complaint.

TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs claims, and each of them, are barred, in whole or part, because the relief sought would improperly interfere with Defendant's discretionary authority.

ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs claims, and each of them, are subject to setoff, offset, and/or recoupment, including, but not limited to, for moneys paid to Plaintiff that exceeded any amounts to which he was entitled.

TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs claims, and each of them, are barred, in whole or part, because he was an at-will employee of the City.

THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiff's claims, and each of them, are barred, in whole or in pru1, by the privileges and immunities applicable to public agencies.

FOURTEENTH AF'FIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiff's Complaint is barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrine of after-acquired evidence.

FIFTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiff has failed to mitigate his damages, if any, as required by law.

SIXTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

To the extent Plaintiff has suffered physical or mental injuries-including "emotional distress"-because of Defendant's conduct, any such damages suffered by Plaintiff are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board by operation of California Labor Code section 3200 et seq.

SEVENTEENTH AFFIRMATNE DEFENSE

Plaintiff's claims, and each of them, are barred, in whole or in part, because Plaintiff ratified, consented, and/or acquiesced to the conduct about which he now complains.

WHEREFORE, Defendant prays as follow:

1. For entry of judgment in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff;

2. That Plaintiff take nothing by way of his Complaint;

3. That Defendant be awarded costs of suit herein;

4. That Defendant be awarded its attorney fees and costs incurred in defending this suit in accordance with applicable law; and

5. For such other and further relief as this Court may deem just.

DATED: August 18, 2014

STRADLING YOCCA CARLSON & RAUTH

A Professional Corporation

By ______________________

Jeffrey A. Dinkin

Robert D. Dominguez

Attorneys for Defendant City of Carmel-by-the-Sea

Hanson v. City of Carmel Answer of Defendant City of Carmel-By-The-sea

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF MONTEREY
JOHN HANSON Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA; and DOES 1 through 100, Defendants
CASE NO. M128436

ANSWER OF DEFENDANT CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA

COMPLAINT, JOHN HANSON, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA and DOES 1 through 100, Defendants (Case No. M128436)

ABSTRACT:  On July 3, 2014, COMPLAINT, JOHN HANSON, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA and DOES 1 through 100, Defendants, Case No. M128436, was filed in SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF MONTEREY.  The COMPLAINT consists of ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION, FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION (Discrimination in Employment), SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION (Wrongful Termination), THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION (Denial of Due Process Rights), FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION (Declaratory Relief), FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION (Age-Based Discrimination in Employment- Disparate Impact), SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION (Breach of Contract), SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION (Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy (Whistleblowing) against Defendant City of Carmel-by-the-Sea) and PRAYER FOR RELIEF.  The CAUSES OF ACTION and PRAYER FOR RELIEF sections are reproduced; the COMPLAINT document is embedded.  A CASE PROGRESS CONFERENCE is scheduled for January 6, 2015, Courtroom 14 at 9:00 A.M.

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF MONTEREY

JOHN HANSON, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA and DOES 1 through 100, Defendants.

Case No. M128436

COMPLAINT

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(Discrimination in Employment)

65. Hanson hereby incorporates by reference all of the preceding allegations as if fully set forth herein.

66. The City discriminated against Hanson with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, as the City tried to force Hanson from his occupation and vested property right to continued employment. The City stigmatized Hanson, deprived him of due process and other California Constitutional rights relating to his employment, and subjected Hanson to punitive action, including termination, both as a result of animus against him based upon age and upon a related campaign of discrimination and arbitrary action carried out against him by the City, including activities related to his military service, his disability, his visibility within the Carmel community, his friendly professional relationships with City staff and officials, his unexcelled knowledge of the Carmel community and his willingness to speak his mind to Stilwell, Paul and others in matters of public consideration and importance. Stilwell, Paul, and other City officials engaged in adverse employment actions against Hanson, in significant part upon a false perception of disability and a failure of the City to investigate and understand the perception of the limitations of disability and to accommodate the disability.

67. As a direct, foreseeable and proximate result of the City's acts and omissions, Hanson suffered substantial emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other losses.

68. As a further direct, foreseeable and proximate result of the City's acts and omissions, Hanson suffered and continues to suffer lost earnings and other employment benefits, future lost earnings, back pay, front pay, lost interest, medical expenses, and other general and special damages, all to Hanson's detriment and damage in an amount to be proven at trial.

69. Hanson has been required to retain legal counsel to vindicate his statutory rights and is entitled to recover attorney fees and litigation expenses.

70. Hanson made timely complaints of discrimination, and the City provided no prompt or effective remedies or investigations of the claims of discrimination.

71. The discriminatory actions of the City were motivated by discriminatory animus of the City officials, including Stilwell and Paul, acting with the support of City officials.

WHEREFORE, Hanson prays for judgment as described below.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

(Wrongful Termination)

72. Hanson hereby incorporates by reference all of the preceding allegations as if fully set forth herein.

73. Hanson did not abandon, waive, or knowingly and voluntarily relinquish his employment rights in 2007, contrary to the City's claims in 2013 and 2014, and was entitled to the rights and benefits afforded by law for permanent public employees whose rights of property and due process are valid and binding rights. The City confiscated Hanson's property, discriminating against Hanson because of his age and for other arbitrary reasons and pretexts, and depriving Hanson of his liberty interest in his employment, as alleged herein. The actions of the City and its agents were arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable and/or a prejudicial abuse of discretion. The City's abuse of discretion has deprived Hanson of his employment, his reputation and his future means of livelihood. The City did not afford Hanson any of his due process, liberty or property rights under the law. The contract terms imposed by the City as part of the 2007 document do not support the City's claims, and Hanson is legally entitled to a judicial ruling on the grounds, or lack of grounds, for termination.

74. As a result of the conduct of the City, Hanson has suffered termination of his employment, and has lost back pay, front pay, benefits, and other economic or financial proceeds, and has suffered emotional distress.

WHEREFORE, Hanson prays for judgment as described below.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

(Denial of Due Process Rights)

75. Hanson hereby incorporates by reference all of the preceding allegations as if fully set forth herein.

76. At all times relevant herein, Hanson was entitled to due process rights under the California Constitution and laws. The City unlawfully denied him his rights, denied him notice and an opportunity to be heard, denied him his rights to a reasonably neutral hearing office, and failed to provide him with his legal rights to a hearing before final action was to be taken.

WHEREFORE, Hanson prays for judgment as described below.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Declaratory Relief)

77. Hanson hereby incorporates by reference all of the preceding allegations as if fully set forth herein.

78. There is a present and active controversy between Hanson and the City about the matters relating to Hanson's employment and due process rights, and Hanson seeks judicial determinations as to the legality and propriety of the City's actions, and particularly in regard to the City's efforts to deprive Hanson of his employment without adequate due process.

79. Hanson has made every reasonable effort to exhaust any remedies provided for by law to clarify and determine the rights of the parties.

WHEREFORE, Hanson prays for judgment as described below.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Age-Based Discrimination in Employment- Disparate Impact)

80. Hanson hereby incorporates by reference all of the preceding allegations as if fully set forth herein.

81. The City's use of salary, benefits, and costs of retirement plans of its older employees as criterion for employment decisions adversely impacts older workers as a group, within the meaning of Government Code section 12941, because these older workers have the highest salaries, most expensive benefits. and most expensive retirement plans. The facially neutral-appearing employer practices in purging older workers from the City work force in fact had an impermissible disproportionate adverse impact on the rights of the protected class of older workers, and the age of these older workers had no bearing upon, or manifest relationship to, bona fides job requirements for the positions held by these employees.

WHEREFORE, Hanson prays for judgment as described below.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Breach of Contract)

82. Hanson hereby incorporates by reference all of the preceding allegations as if fully set forth herein.

83. Having deprived Hanson of his pre-termination rights, the City in 2013 sought to terminate Hanson under the invalid 2007 contract, and breached that contract as well by denying Hanson his rights, by creating and then relying upon a false set of "facts" to terminate Hanson for alleged good cause, and by denying Hanson even the severance pay guaranteed by the invalid 2007 contract. The Employment Agreement states that the City could terminate Hanson's employment for cause without his consent only in the event that Hanson is convicted of a felony or other crime involving moral turpitude or any offense involving a violation of his official duties or if it is determined by the City Administrator that Hanson misappropriated public funds, commingled public funds with personal funds, engaged in willful corrupt conduct in office, or conducted himself in a manner to be determined as willful conduct that constitutes misconduct according to the City's personnel rules. Hanson has not engaged in any such conduct, nor has he been charged or convicted of any crime, nor has the City given notice or produced any evidence of such conduct.

84. The City breached the invalid Employment Agreement by terminating Hanson, by making false charges against him, by failing to timely notify him of charges against him and by failing to conduct or complete an investigation of its charges against Hanson in a timely manner, by wrongfully failing and refusing to reinstate Hanson to his employment as Building Official, and by impairing Hanson's contract, as alleged herein. All such actions by the City were impermissibly motivated by animus and by a City goal of reducing salaries and pension rights by terminating or otherwise forcing older workers from their positions with the City.

85. The City and its agents, officers. officials and/or employees, failed to take all reasonable steps required by law to end harassment in employment based on age, and to act promptly and effectively to prevent and remedy harassment.

86. The City failed to reasonably prevent Stilwell's and Paul's abuse of their power, failed to investigate and prevent the their continuing violation of Hanson and other employees' rights by forcing employees from City employment on the basis of age, failed to remedy the complaints or timely and adequately investigate complaints, failed to take appropriate action or oversight in regard to Stilwell's and Paul's actions. and endorsed, ratified. and sanctioned their actions.

87. As a direct, foreseeable and proximate result of the City's acts and omissions, Hanson has suffered substantial losses and damages.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy (Whistleblowing) against Defendant City of Carmel-by-the-Sea)

88. Hanson hereby incorporates by reference all of the preceding allegations as if fully set forth herein.

89. The conduct of the City constituted wrongful termination of Hanson in violation of public policy.

90. As a result of the conduct of the City, Hanson has suffered termination of his employment, and has lost back pay, front pay, benefits, and other economic or financial proceeds, and has suffered emotional distress.

91. The City's conduct was willful, knowing and intentional.

WHEREFORE, Hanson prays for judgment as described below.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Plaintiff John Hanson prays for judgment as follows on the six causes of action herein:

1.  On the first. second, third, fifth. and seventh causes of action herein, Hanson seeks an award of compensatory damages and costs as permitted by law, including a money Judgment for loss of employment, back pay, front pay, benefits, mental pain and anguish, and compensation for emotional distress according to proof, economic and special damages, including compensatory damages for lost past and future wages and employment benefits, and other economic injury and damages according to proof;

2.  On the fourth cause of action herein, Hanson seeks an order determining and declaring Hanson's rights with regard to his employment and due process rights, and further determining and declaring the illegal nature of the City's actions with regard to the deprivation of Hanson's employment without adequate due process;

3.  On the sixth cause of action herein, Hanson seeks an award of compensatory damages and costs as permitted by law, including a money Judgment for loss of employment, back pay, front pay, benefits, and economic and special damages, including compensatory damages for lost past and future wages and employment benefits, and other economic injury and damages according to proof;

4.   For reasonable attorney fees and costs;

5.   For an award of interest, including prejudgment interest, at the legal rate;

6.  For costs of suit; and

7.  For such other and further relief as the Court deems proper

Dated: July 3, 2014

Signed Molly E. Erickson

Michael W. Stamp

Molly E. Erickson

STAMP I ERICKSON

Attorneys for Plaintiff,

John Hanson

Hanson v. City of Carmel-By-The-sea (Case No. m128436)

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF MONTEREY

JOHN HANSON, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA and DOES 1 through 100, Defendants.

Case No. M128436

COMPLAINT

John Hanson, Claimant, GOVERNMENT CLAIM FOR DAMAGES AGAINST THE CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA

ABSTRACT: The GOVERNMENT CLAIM document regarding John Hanson’s claim for damages against the City of Carmel-by-the-Sea, dated December 17, 2013, is embedded. The Claim of Claimant John Hanson, former Building Official, states, in part, that “The City of Carmel-by-the-Sea violated Mr. Hanson's rights under the United States Constitution, the California Constitution and California and Federal law, including the City's own governing ordinance” and “The City of Carmel-by-the-Sea's actions constituted wrongful termination of Mr. Hanson in violation of California law.” HIGHLIGHT EXCERPTS are presented.

HIGHLIGHT EXCERPTS:

• Beginning in March 2013, and leading to unlawful action taken against Mr. Hanson in August 2013, the City undercut Mr. Hanson, interfered with his performance of his duties, and misrepresented his work. The incidents giving rise to this claim show a course of conduct whereby top City administration (Jason Stilwell and Susan Paul, among others), interfered with Mr. Hanson's duties and Building Department operations, sometimes without conferring with, or even informing Mr. Hanson, unduly criticized Mr. Hanson about his job performance and qualifications, took contradictory and inconsistent positions, discriminated against Mr. Hanson based on age, medical condition/disability, and status as an active duty member of the military, and generally created a hostile work environment for Mr. Hanson, leading to his termination without any basis and without any due process given.

• The City of Carmel-by-the-Sea's actions constituted wrongful termination of Mr. Hanson in violation of California law.

• The agents of the City of Carmel-by-the-Sea defamed Mr. Hanson by publishing to other employees, the general public and other persons false, unprivileged, defamatory, and slanderous statements charging Mr. Hanson with misconduct and lack of credentials and other statements which exposed Mr. Hanson to hatred, contempt, ridicule or obloquy, causing him injury and tending to injure him in respect to his profession and employment, and causing irreparable loss of his reputation in the community.

• The agents of the City of Carmel-by-the-Sea unlawfully discriminated against Mr. Hanson because of his age, in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Government Code section 12900 et seq. and the Older Americans Act. The actions of the City to arbitrarily suspend or fire employees during the past year have a disparate impact upon older workers, and the City's tactics were intended to, and did, abuse the processes of involuntary leave and summary terminations in order to scare and intimidate employees of the City, prevent them from testifying about what they have seen and learned, and force them from their employment for money-saving reasons that cause harm to the employees.

• The agents of the City unlawfully discriminated against Mr. Hanson due to his medical-related disability and history (post-traumatic stress disorder), and failed to accommodate his medical-related disability in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Government Code section 12900 et seq. and the Americans with Disabilities Act.

• The City Carmel-by-the-Sea unlawfully discriminated against Mr. Hanson because of his employment with the military in violation of Military leave laws (Mil. & Vet. Code,§ 389 et seq.) and the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA).

• The actions of the City of Carmel-by-the-Sea constitute retaliation against Mr. Hanson for whistleblowing about the City's improper and discriminatory conduct. (Lab. 23 Code,§ 1102.5.)

• RESPONSIBLE OFFICIALS: Jason Stilwell, City Administrator, and other employees, agents, officers, and officials of the City of Carmel-by-the-Sea whose roles and actions are not fully known at this time.

Hanson John v. City of Carmel Claim

CLAIM FOR DAMAGES AGAINST THE CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA

John Hanson c/o Law Offices of Michael W. Stamp
December 17, 2013