Showing posts with label Historic Resources Board. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Historic Resources Board. Show all posts

Wednesday, January 14, 2015

AMENDED CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA PLANNING COMMISSON AND HISTORIC RESOURCES BOARD SPECIAL MEETING AGENDA, January 13, 2015

*AMENDED
CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA
PLANNING COMMISSON AND HISTORIC RESOURCES BOARD
SPECIAL MEETING AGENDA
Forest Theater Site Tour
Northeast comer of Santa Rita St. and Mountain View Ave.
January 13, 2015

NOTE: “The City Council is expected to consider the second phase and other theater matters at a 6:30 p.m. meeting Thursday at City Hall,” according to reporting in The Monterey County Herald.

REFERENCE:
Carmel Planning Commission gets a closer look at Forest Theater
By Tom Leyde, The Monterey County Herald
Posted: 01/13/15

Monday, October 27, 2014

CITY COUNCIL, FOREST AND BEACH COMMISSION, COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES & CULTURAL COMMISSION, HISTORICAL RESOURCES BOARD, PLANNING COMMISSION SPECIAL WORK-STUDY SESSION, October 29, 2014

FOREST THEATER RENOVATION
CITY OF CARMEL - BY - THE - SEA
CODY ANDERSON WASNEY ARCHITECTS

Special Work-study Session Agenda 10-29-14
AGENDA 
CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA CITY COUNCIL, FOREST AND BEACH COMMISSION, COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES & CULTURAL COMMISSION, HISTORICAL RESOURCES BOARD, PLANNING COMMISSION
SPECIAL WORK-STUDY SESSION
Wednesday, October 29, 2014

Staff Report Forest Theater 10-29-14 Meeting
CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA
Council Report
October 29, 2014
Subject: Update of the Forest Theater Renovation

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
On October 21, 2014, City Council received an update on the Forest Theater by Chris Wasney of Cody Anderson Wasney Architects. The update included an assessment of the facilities, its current deficiencies, and the proposed schematic scope of work to address the deficiencies. Council requested the architect to explore other options pertaining to accessible seating and path of travel. In addition, Council requested the architect continue to explore the concept of the boardwalk as an accessible path of travel; the feasibility of reducing stairs to access seating; the use of handrails for aisle seating and adding more curvature to the proposed accessible parking and driveway. The purpose of this agenda item is to receive an update from Cody Anderson Wasney Architects regarding these possible design changes and then consider authorizing the project to move forward for preparation of construction documents, permits and bidding in order to reopen the facility by June 2015.

Saturday, October 18, 2014

CITY COUNCIL, FOREST AND BEACH COMMISSION, COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES & CULTURAL COMMISSION, HISTORICAL RESOURCES BOARD, PLANNING COMMISSION SPECIAL WORK-STUDY SESSION AND CLOSED SESSION OF THE CITY COUNCIL, October 21, 2014

ABSTRACT: The CITY COUNCIL, FOREST AND BEACH COMMISSION, COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES & CULTURAL COMMISSION, HISTORICAL RESOURCES BOARD, PLANNING COMMISSION SPECIAL WORK-STUDY SESSION AND CLOSED SESSION OF THE CITY COUNCIL, October 21, 2014, Agenda Packet is embedded.  Regarding SPECIAL WORK-STUDY SESSION, Council Report Highlights:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The City retained Cody Anderson Wasney Architects in August 2014 to assess the Forest Theater and make recommendations regarding the improvements required to reopen the facility (“Triage Phase”). The purpose of this meeting is to receive an update by Chris Wasney on the needs assessment of the Theater, including the proposed mitigations to address current deficiencies and the estimated costs of the various mitigations.  This item also requests the consideration of the approval of the plan and authorizing staff, working with the architect, to move forward in preparing construction documents needed to obtain permits and prepare for bidding of the project so that it can reopen in spring 2015.
The estimated cost includes construction items related to structural, electrical, inadequate exiting, inadequate lighting and inadequate accessibility, and associated architectural and other fees. At this time, the estimate is $1,379,523.
RECOMMENDATION(S):
(A) Receive an update on the Forest Theater.
(B) Authorization for the Project to move forward for preparation of Construction Documents, Permits and Bidding.

AMENDED AGENDA Special Workstudy & Closed Session Packet 10-21-14
*AMENDED AGENDA
CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA
CITY COUNCIL, FOREST AND BEACH COMMISSION, COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES & CULTURAL COMMISSION, HISTORICAL RESOURCES BOARD, PLANNING COMMISSION
SPECIAL WORK-STUDY SESSION AND CLOSED SESSION OF THE CITY COUNCIL
Tuesday, October 21, 2014 – 4:00 p.m.

Thursday, December 20, 2012

HISTORIC RESOURCES BOARD AGENDA ITEM Consideration of the recirculated final environmental impact report for the sale of Flanders Mansion Project and advise the Planning Commission on its adequacy regarding historical, cultural and aesthetic resources, 10 December 2012

ABSTRACT: On Monday, 10 December 2012, the Historic Resources Board held a Special Meeting concerning APPLICATIONS Consideration of the recirculated final environmental impact report for the sale of Flanders Mansion Project and advise the Planning Commission on its adequacy regarding historical, cultural and aesthetic resources.
STAFF COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The proposed project, or any alternative that transfers control of the Flanders Mansion to another party, could result in changes that diminish the integrity of the historical resource and limit the public's enjoyment of the building. These effects would not be consistent with the City's policies of preserving historical resources and encouraging public enjoyment of them. The EIR correctly identifies these as potentially significant impacts. The EIR also identifies mitigation measures that would reduce these potential impacts. All of this was accepted by the Court.
The discussion in the EIR is comprehensive and thorough enough to disclose the project's impacts related to historical, cultural and aesthetic resources. The mitigation measures identified in the document would reduce the significance of these impacts to a less-than-significant level. Taken as a whole, the EIR appears adequate to supply the Council with enough, appropriate information about impacts, alternatives and mitigations to make informed decisions about the project. The Historic Resources Board reviewed the 2009 EIR on 20 April 2009 and forwarded a recommendation to the Planning Commission that the EIR was adequate. The 2012 EIR contains additional analysis and a more thorough response to public comments.
For all of these reasons, staff recommends that the Historic Resources Board forward a recommendation to the Planning Commission that the 2012 EIR is adequate for reviewing impacts, alternatives and mitigations regarding historic preservation, cultural resources and aesthetic resources related to public enjoyment of the Flanders Mansion as a historical resource. Staff also recommends forwarding the attached advice from the Board's 2009 review of the EIR. It remains valid and would strengthen the mitigation measures. If the Board has other comments or recommendations to make, these will also be forwarded to the Planning Commission and to the City Council. 

The Agenda, Staff Report, Staff Report Attachment and supporting materials are embedded.
AGENDA PACKET, SPECIAL MEETING
HISTORIC RESOURCES BOARD
December 10, 2012

Tuesday, October 26, 2010

Historic Preservation Ordinance

ABSTRACT: The City of Carmel-by-the-Sea's Historic Preservation Ordinance is uploaded. "The purpose of the historic preservation ordinance is to establish standards, procedures and regulations to promote identification, and preservation, and enhancement of historic resources including buildings, structures, objects, sites, districts and archaeological resources that represent the unique architectural, cultural, historic and prehistoric identity of Carmel-by-the-Sea."


Historic Preservation Ordinance

Tuesday, June 15, 2010

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT: Reversed & Remanded to trial court w/directions (Mandurrago et al. v. City of Carmel-By-The-Sea et al.)

ABSTRACT: Disposition today, 15 June 2010 - the opinion was filed with the Court to reverse and remand to trial court with directions. Justice Nathan D. Mihara authored the opinion and Justices Franklin D. Elia and Richard J. McAdams concurred. The opinion (thirteen pages) is reproduced in its entirety. The Disposition states: "The trial court's order granting the motion to strike and awarding the City and the City Council their attorney's fees and costs is reversed. Upon remand, the trial court is directed to vacate both its order granting the motion and awarding attorney's fees and costs and its judgment of dismissal. Mandurrago shall recover his appellate costs."

Mandurrago et al. v. City of Carmel-By-The-Sea et al.
Case: H034439, 6th District


Disposition date (YYYY-MM-DD): 2010-06-15

Disposition description: Reversed & Remanded to trial court w/directions

Disposition status as of 2010-06-15: Final

Notes:
reversed with directions; ndm, fde, rjm

Unpublished opinion of the California Courts of Appeal
Filed 6/15/10 Mandurrago v. City of Caramel-by-The-Sea CA6


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT


JOHN MANDURRAGO et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.

H034439
(Monterey County Super. Ct. No. M97273)


In December 2008, defendant City Council of the City of Carmel-By-The-Sea (the City Council) overturned the Carmel Planning Commission's certification of the environmental impact report (EIR) for a project proposed by plaintiffs John Mandurrago and Pacific Grove Land Company, LLC (hereafter collectively Mandurrago). Mandurrago then filed a mandate petition and complaint against the City Council and the City of Carmel-By-The-Sea (the City) in which he contended that the City Council's December 2008 decision was invalid because it conflicted with a November 2006 City Council decision and with various state statutes. The City and the City Council filed a special motion to strike Mandurrago's causes of action under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. The trial court granted the special motion to strike and awarded attorney's fees to the City and the City Council. Mandurrago appeals and contends that the City and the City Council failed to establish that his action fell within the purview of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. We agree and reverse.

I. Factual Allegations

Mandurrago's petition and complaint made the following factual allegations. In September 2001, Mandurrago filed with the City an application for a development project. The proposed project entailed the demolition of the existing structures on the parcel, the construction of a building that would combine retail and underground parking, and the construction of a building containing seven market-rate residential units. By October 2005, a final EIR (FEIR) had been completed for the proposed development. The FEIR concluded that the existing bank building on the parcel is not historic. The City Council thereafter referred the proposed project to the City's Historic Resources Board (the HRB) to determine whether the demolition of the bank building would result in the loss of a historic resource, a loss of architectural diversity, or a violation of the City's local coastal plan. The HRB determined that the bank building is historic.

Mandurrago appealed the HRB's decision to the City Council. In November 2006, the City Council reversed the HRB's decision and made findings that the bank building did not “ 'make an unusually strong contribution to history, architecture, engineering or culture.' ” In December 2006, the Planning Commission ordered the FEIR revised to indicate that the demolition of the bank building would have a significant adverse impact on the physical environment and visual quality due to “ 'the loss of great architecture.' ” The FEIR was recirculated after its revision. In December 2006, Mandurrago revised the project application to state that two of the seven residential units would be affordable.

In August 2008, the Planning Commission certified the recirculated, revised FEIR, made findings that the impact of demolition of the bank building was unavoidable, and approved the proposed project. A citizen appealed the Planning Commission's decision to the City Council. In December 2008, the City Council sustained the appeal. The City Council concluded that its November 2006 decision was “exclusive to historicity” and did not address whether the demolition of the bank building would be a significant impact on the environment under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.).

II. Procedural Background

In February 2009, Mandurrago filed a verified petition for mandate and administrative mandate combined with a complaint for damages and declaratory and injunctive relief against the City and the City Council. The petition/complaint alleged six causes of action.

The first three causes of action sought a writ of mandate requiring the City Council to “set aside and void” its December 2008 decision sustaining the citizen's appeal, to certify the unrevised FEIR, rather than the revised FEIR, and to approve the proposed project.

The first cause of action, which sought administrative mandate, alleged that the City had (a) “illegal[ly]” “sustain[ed] . . . the [citizen's] appeal” in violation of various state statutes, (b) violated CEQA “by failing to certify the EIR” within one year after its completion, and (c) deprived Mandurrago of due process by limiting the time that he was allowed at the hearing to respond to the citizen's appeal. The second cause of action, which sought traditional mandate, was based on the same allegations and asserted that the City had abused its discretion “by failing to deny [the citizen's] appeal . . . .” The third cause of action, which also seemed to seek traditional mandate, alleged that the City Council's December 2008 decision was “not supported by substantial evidence” because it did not include findings required by various statutes.

The fourth cause of action sought damages and injunctive relief for alleged violations of Mandurrago's civil rights. Mandurrago alleged that the City's failure to take “final action” on his development application was intended to “delay, harass, or deny the project as the City's method to retaliate against [plaintiffs] for [their] desire to demolition [sic]” the bank building. The fifth cause of action sought a declaratory judgment that the City's “sustaining of the [citizen's] appeal was not lawfully adopted” and did not “comply with CEQA, HAA [Housing Accountability Act (Gov. Code, § 65589.5)1], and the previous Carmel findings concerning the project.” The sixth cause of action sought an injunction requiring, among other things, that the City Council rescind its December 2008 decision.

The City and the City Council filed a verified “Response” to Mandurrago's petition “and related actions” and a demurrer to Mandurrago's petition/complaint.2 The City and the City Council subsequently filed a special motion to strike all or some of the causes of action in the petition/complaint. They also sought to recover their attorney's fees and costs.

Mandurrago filed opposition to the demurrer and opposition to the motion to strike. He asserted that the acts targeted in the petition/complaint did not fall within the scope of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. He contended that the motion to strike was frivolous, thereby entitling him to recover his attorney's fees. Mandurrago also contended that he had a probability of prevailing on his causes of action.

The trial court granted the motion to strike, awarded costs and attorney's fees to the City and the City Council, and entered a judgment of dismissal. The court “dropped” the demurrer because the granting of the motion to strike “makes the demurrer moot.” Mandurrago timely filed a notice of appeal from the court's order granting the motion to strike.

1 The Housing Accountability Act provides that a local agency “shall not disapprove a housing development project . . . for very low, low-, or moderate-income households, or an emergency shelter, or condition approval in a manner that renders the project infeasible for development for the use of very low, low-, or moderate-income households, or an emergency shelter, including through the use of design review standards, unless it makes [one of five specific] written findings, based upon substantial evidence in the record . . . .” (Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (d).) Mandurrago did not allege that the City had “disapprove[d]” or conditionally approved its proposed project.

2 The City subsequently lodged the four-volume administrative record with the trial court.

III. Discussion

“A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1), italics added.)

“ '[A]ct in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue' includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest; (4) or any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e).)

“In short, the statutory phrase 'cause of action . . . arising from' means simply that the defendant's act underlying the plaintiff's cause of action must itself have been an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech. [Citations.] In the anti-SLAPP context, the critical point is whether the plaintiff's cause of action itself was based on an act in furtherance of the defendant's right of petition or free speech.” (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 78.)

“The moving defendant's burden is to demonstrate that the act or acts of which the plaintiff complains were taken 'in furtherance of the [defendant]'s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue,' as defined in the statute. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) If the court finds such a showing has been made, it then determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.” (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.) We independently review the trial court‟s finding that the City and the City Council satisfied their burden of showing that Mandurrago's causes of action arose from acts in furtherance of the City's or the City Council's right of petition or free speech. (Paiva v. Nichols (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1007, 1016.)

“In deciding whether the 'arising from' requirement is met, a court considers 'the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.' (§ 425.16, subd. (b).)” (City of Cotati v. Cashman, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 79.) “[I]t is the principal thrust or gravamen of the plaintiff's cause of action that determines whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies [citation], and when the allegations referring to arguably protected activity are only incidental to a cause of action based essentially on nonprotected activity, collateral allusions to protected activity should not subject the cause of action to the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Martinez v. Metabolife Internat., Inc. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 181, 188; Episcopal Church Cases (2009) 45 Cal.4th 467, 477.) “The anti-SLAPP statute‟s definitional focus is not the form of the plaintiff‟s cause of action but, rather, the defendant's activity that gives rise to his or her asserted liability—and whether that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 92.)

The issue before us is whether any or all of Mandurrago's causes of action arose from an act or acts by the City or the City Council that were in furtherance of the City's or the City Council's right of petition or free speech. “[T]he statutory remedy afforded by section 425.16 extends to statements and writings of governmental entities and public officials on matters of public interest and concern that would fall within the scope of the statute if such statements were made by a private individual or entity.” (Vargas v. City of Salinas (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1, 17, italics added.)

The City and the City Council rely primarily on the Second District Court of Appeal's decision in Mission Oaks Ranch, Ltd. v. County of Santa Barbara (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 713 (Mission Oaks), disapproved on other grounds in Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1123, fn. 10.) Mission Oaks was a developer that submitted an application to the County for approval of a large subdivision project. (Mission Oaks, at p. 718.) The County contracted with consultants to prepare an EIR for the project. (Mission Oaks, at pp. 718-719.) The consultants prepared a draft EIR which found “a multitude of significant adverse and unmitigable impacts presented by the project proposal on numerous basic resources.” (Mission Oaks, at p. 719.) Mission Oaks challenged the consultants‟ findings, but the County decided to accept the consultants' findings and included those findings in the final EIR. (Mission Oaks, at p. 719.) The County then denied the project application. (Mission Oaks, at p. 719.)

Mission Oaks filed a complaint for damages against both the County and the consultants. The complaint alleged that the draft EIR was a “sham” that was unsupported by the facts and had been prepared as a part of a conspiracy between the consultants and the County to deny Mission Oaks the right to develop its property. (Mission Oaks, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 720.) Mission Oaks claimed that the County had “ 'falsely encouraged' ” it to proceed with the EIR process even though the County never intended to approve the project. (Mission Oaks, at p. 720.) Mission Oaks alleged three causes of action against the consultants' misrepresentation, breach of contract, and negligence. It alleged one cause of action against the County for breach of contract, in which it alleged that the EIR had not been prepared in compliance with CEQA and that the fees charged were unreasonable. (Mission Oaks, at pp. 720, 721.) The trial court sustained the County's demurrer and granted a special motion to strike brought by both the County and the consultants, but the court denied the County its attorney‟s fees. (Mission Oaks, at pp. 720, 729.)

Mission Oaks challenged the trial court's granting of the special motion to strike. It argued that the consultants' actions were not subject to a special motion to strike because those actions were done for pay. (Mission Oaks, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at pp. 728-729.) The Second District held that commercial speech and conduct are subject to a special motion to strike when they concern a matter of public interest. (Mission Oaks, at pp. 728-729.) It found that Mission Oaks's causes of action were aimed at the consultants' speech—the statements in the draft EIR. (Mission Oaks, at p. 729.) Mission Oaks did not separately contend that the trial court had erred in granting the special motion to strike as to the County. The County challenged the trial court's refusal to award it attorney's fees as a prevailing party on the special motion to strike. (Mission Oaks, at p. 729.) The trial court's refusal had been based on its erroneous conclusion that a governmental entity was not a “ 'person' ” within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. (Mission Oaks, at p. 729.) The Second District held otherwise: “Our Constitution protects everyone, even politicians.” (Mission Oaks, at p. 730.)

Mission Oaks stands for just two propositions: (1) statements in an EIR are protected speech; and (2) a governmental entity is a “ 'person' ” within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. Thus, if any of Mandurrago's causes of action were based on statements in an EIR, Mission Oaks would support a conclusion that those causes of action fell within the scope of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. On the other hand, if any of his causes of action did not arise from statements in an EIR but instead from the City Council's decision upholding the citizen‟s appeal, Mission Oaks neither considered nor resolved whether those causes of action would fall within the scope of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. “Obviously, cases are not authority for propositions not considered therein.” (Roberts v. City of Palmdale (1993) 5 Cal.4th 363, 372.)

The First District Court of Appeal's opinion in San Ramon Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. Contra Costa County Employees’ Retirement Assn. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 343 (San Ramon) addressed the question of whether Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 applies to a cause of action arising from a governmental entity's decision. In San Ramon, the Contra Costa County Employees' Retirement Association's Board (the Board) decided that the San Ramon Valley Fire Protection District (the District) was obligated to pay $2.3 million for increased benefits for the District's employees. (San Ramon, at pp. 346-348.) The District filed a mandamus petition and a complaint for declaratory relief challenging the Board's decision. (San Ramon, at pp. 348-349.) It sought orders reducing its obligation to $999,000. (San Ramon, at p. 349.) The Board filed a special motion to strike the District's complaint and petition. The trial court found that the District's causes of action did not arise out of acts in furtherance of the Board's right to petition or free speech and denied the motion. (San Ramon, at p. 352.)

The Board appealed and claimed that its decision to impose the $2.3 million obligation on the District was conduct in furtherance of its right to free speech. (San Ramon, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 353.) The First District rejected this contention. “Acts of governance mandated by law, without more, are not exercises of free speech or petition.” (San Ramon, at p. 354.) “As to the Board's substantive action in the present case, there is nothing about that decision, qua governmental action, that implicates the exercise of free speech or petition. The Board's resolution was simply to impose a requirement that the District pay a contribution to the CCCERA of nearly $2.3 million for proposed enhanced retirement benefits to District employees. Thus, while the District's petition arises out of the Board's adoption of the $2.3 million contribution rate, the substance of the Board‟s action does not constitute the exercise of the Board's right of speech or petition.” (San Ramon, at p. 355.)

“As noted, the Board was not sued based on the content of speech it has promulgated or supported, nor on its exercise of a right to petition. The action challenged consists of charging the District more for certain pension contributions than the District believes is appropriate. This is not governmental action which is speech-related. By contrast, if the action taken by the Board had been to authorize participation in a campaign to amend state pension laws, or to become actively involved in a voter initiative seeking such changes, then the Board's own exercise of free speech might be implicated. But this is not the case, and this distinguishing feature is dispositive of the Board's argument.” (San Ramon, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 357.) The First District found Mission Oaks to be “easily distinguishable” because the developer's causes of action there arose out of “speech” in the EIR. (San Ramon, at p. 357.)

The First District concluded that Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 does not apply to acts of governance that are not themselves in furtherance of governmental speech. “To decide otherwise would significantly burden the petition rights of those seeking mandamus review for most types of governmental action. Many of the public entity decisions reviewable by mandamus or administrative mandamus are arrived at after discussion and a vote at a public meeting. [Citations.] If mandamus petitions challenging decisions reached in this manner were routinely subject to a special motion to strike—which would be the result if we adopted the Board's position in this case—the petitioners in every such case could be forced to make a prima facie showing of merit at the pleading stage. While that result might not go so far as to impliedly repeal the mandamus statutes, as the District contends, it would chill the resort to legitimate judicial oversight over potential abuses of legislative and administrative power, which is at the heart of those remedial statutes. It would also ironically impose an undue burden upon the very right of petition for those seeking mandamus review in a manner squarely contrary to the underlying legislative intent behind section 425.16.” (San Ramon, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at pp. 357-358, fn. omitted.)

The First District's analysis in San Ramon was recently adopted by the Second District Court of Appeal in Graffiti Protection Coatings, Inc. v. City of Pico Rivera (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1207 (GPC). GPC had filed an action for mandate and declaratory relief challenging the City's decision to award a contract without competitive bidding. The trial court granted the City's special motion to strike, and GPC appealed. (GPC, at pp. 1213-1214.) The Second District concluded that the City‟s decision to award the contract without competitive bidding was not an act in furtherance of the City's right to petition or free speech and therefore a cause of action arising therefrom did not fall within the scope of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. (GPC, at pp. 1219-1220, 1224-1225.)

An examination of the petition/complaint reveals that Mandurrago's causes of action fall into two groups. Four of his causes of action plainly arose from the City Council's decision sustaining the citizen's appeal. All three of the mandamus causes of action alleged that this decision was unlawful. The first cause of action claimed that “Carmel's action sustaining [sic] of the appeal is illegal under CEQA, HAA, and related Government Code housing statutes . . . .” The second cause of action claimed that “Carmel's December 2, 2008 action sustaining [sic] of the appeal is contrary to State law, regulations, and decisions . . . .” The third cause of action alleged that “Carmel's December 2, 2008 findings and conclusion sustaining the appeal did not meet the requirements of Government Code §65589.5(d)(2) . . . .” All three mandamus causes of action sought a writ of mandate requiring the City to “vacate” its decision sustaining the appeal. The fifth cause of action, which sought declaratory relief, was also based on the sustaining of the appeal. It alleged that “Carmel's sustaining of the appeal was not lawfully adopted . . . .” However, the relief sought for this cause of action ventured far beyond the validity of the City's decision to sustain the appeal.

We encounter no difficulty in concluding that the three mandamus causes of action did not arise from an act in furtherance of the City Council's right of petition or free speech. As in San Ramon and GPC, the City Council's decision on the citizen's appeal was simply a mandated act of governance, and it did not in and of itself further the City Council’s right of petition or free speech. This decision was not speech-related and did not involve the City Council's right of petition. Nor did the declaratory relief cause of action arise from an act in furtherance of the City Council's right of petition or free speech. Though the prayer regarding this cause of action sought a very extensive declaration, the sole basis upon which the cause of action was based was the City Council's decision on the citizen's appeal. That act of the City Council was not in furtherance of the City Council's speech or petition rights. Hence, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting the motion to strike as to the three mandamus causes of action and the declaratory relief cause of action.

Mandurrago's civil rights cause of action is not as easy to categorize. This cause of action alleged as civil rights violations the City's (a) “seven year processing of the application,” (b) “imposi[ition of] new EIR requirements,” (c) “imposi[tion of] conditions,” and (d) “four year delay in certification of the EIR.” While some of these allegations may involve to some extent the City Council's acts in furtherance of its free speech rights, our task is to determine whether the gravamen of Mandurrago's civil rights cause of action arises from an act in furtherance of the City's right of petition or free speech.

We do not doubt that the certification of an EIR is a speech-related decision by a governmental entity because the EIR is the means by which the governmental entity expresses itself. But the failure to timely certify an EIR does not itself further the governmental entity's right of free speech. If anything, the failure to timely certify an EIR may impede the governmental entity's right of free speech as it delays the governmental entity's expression of its views on the environmental impact of a proposed project. We cannot see how the City's imposition of EIR requirements and conditions on Mandurrago's project is an act in furtherance of the City's right of free speech. The City and the City Council fail to explain how their imposition of such requirements furthers their right of free speech. We conclude that the trial court erred in finding that Mandurrago's civil rights cause of action fell within the scope of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.

The only remaining cause of action is Mandurrago's “Injunctive Relief” cause of action. This cause of action merely realleged all of the previous allegations as a basis for injunctive relief. Since none of the other causes of action fell within the scope of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the trial court erred in finding that this cause of action, which had no independent basis, fell within the scope of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.

IV. Disposition

The trial court's order granting the motion to strike and awarding the City and the City Council their attorney's fees and costs is reversed. Upon remand, the trial court is directed to vacate both its order granting the motion and awarding attorney's fees and costs and its judgment of dismissal. Mandurrago shall recover his appellate costs.

_______________________________
Mihara, J.


WE CONCUR:

_____________________________
Elia, Acting P. J.

_____________________________
McAdams, J.

Sunday, June 06, 2010

JOHN MANDURRAGO ET AL. V. CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA, ET AL. SUMMARY: PETITIONERS’ COMPLAINT & OPENING BRIEF, RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF and PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF

NOTE:
CALIFORNIA APPELLATE COURTS
6th Appellate District
Mandurrago et al. v. City of Carmel-By-The-Sea et al.
Court of Appeal Case: H034439
Trial Court Case: M97273
Justices Nathan Mihara, Franklin Elia and Richard McAdams heard Oral Arguments on April 6, 2010 in Santa Clara, CA.; decision anticipated within 90 days, no Disposition as of June 4, 2010.

ABSTRACT: With regard to Mandurrago et al. v. City of Carmel-By-The-Sea et al. (M102802) (or Mandurrago II), selected excerpts and LEGAL ARGUMENT summary outlines from the PETITIONERS’ COMPLAINT and OPENING BRIEF, RESPONDENTS’BRIEF and PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF are presented. The Writ of Mandate Hearing is scheduled for Wednesday, June 9, 2010 at 1:30 P.M., Judge Lydia M. Villarreal, Courtroom 15, Monterey Courthouse, 1200 Aguajito Rd., Monterey, CA.

Anthony Lombardo, Esq., #109650
Dennis Beougher, Esq., #103388
LOMBARDO & GILLES, LLP
318 Cayuga St., P.O. Box 2119
Salinas, CA. 93901

Filed December 4, 2009

Attorneys for Petitioners and Plaintiffs
John Mandurrago and Pacific Grove Land Company, LLC

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MONTEREY

JOHN MANDURRAGO, AND PACIFIC GROVE LAND COMPANY, LLC,
Petitioner and Plaintiff,

CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA, CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA CITY COUNCIL, et al.,
Respondents and Defendants


CASE NO. M102802

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Petition for Writ of Mandamus)
CCP 1094.5

Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in this complaint as well as paragraphs 1 through 36 as though those allegations were set forth in full at this point.

Petitioner has exhausted its administrative remedies by pursuing to completion all administrative remedies that Carmel provided to Petitioner.

In doing the things alleged within this writ/complaint, Carmel acted in excess of its jurisdiction, denied Petitioner a fair hearing, and subjected petitioner to a prejudicial abuse of discretion. Carmel did not proceed in the manner required by law, Carmel’s denial of the Project is not supported by the findings, and the findings are not supported by the evidence.

Petitioner has timely filed the summons and complaint as Carmel’s November 3, 2009 action taken on the Petitioner’s appeal of the Planning Commission’s approval of the EIR and related denial of Project’s development permits, as this action involves a proceeding to attack, review, set aside, void, or annul a finding or determination or decision of a public agency, as stated in California Code of Regulations, title 14, Section 15112.

Petitioner personally objected orally and/or in writing and either the Petitioner or someone else raised at administrative level all factual and legal objections asserted in the writ/complaint.

Petitioner does not have a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Unless this writ of mandate issues, Petitioner will not be able to challenge the City’s November 3, 2009 findings denying the Petitioner’s appeal concerning the Project as the Project involves as action pursuant to CEQA, Government Code section 65009 and the Subdivision Map Act. Carmel has a clear, present, and ministerial duty to require the preparation of EIR pursuant to CEQA, notwithstanding Carmel’s misinterpretation of its previous November 7, 2006 action, HAA, Subdivision Map Act, and the State housing laws.

Petitioner mailed or personally served a Notice of Commencement of Proceedings on Carmel prior to the writ/complaint being filed, as required by Public Resources Code section 21167.5

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Petition for Writ of Mandamus, CCP 1085)

Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the complaint, including, but not limited to, paragraphs 1 through 43, as though those allegations were set forth in full at this point.

Petitioner does not have a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Petitioner has a clear, present, and beneficial right to compel performance of the duty.

By taking the actions alleged herein, the City has failed to perform its ministerial duties.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Housing Accountability Act, and Density Bonus Law, Government Code 6589.5 and 6591.5)

Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the complaint, including, but not limited to, paragraphs 1 through 48 as though those allegations were set forth in full at this point.

Two of the Project’s seven residential units would be deed restricted to qualify the Project as a qualified housing development/affordable housing project under Government Code section 65589.5 and Government Code section 65915.

Petitioner agreed to continued affordability of the two affordable low income units that qualified Petitioner for the award of the incentives/concessions under Government Code section 65915 as well as the requirements of Government Code section 65589.5.

Petitioner submitted to the City a proposal for the specific incentives or concessions that Petitioner requested pursuant to Government Code section 65915. The City refused to grant the concessions/incentives requested by Petitioner, and the City did not make a written finding, based upon substantial evidence, reflecting the requirements in Government Code section 65915 (d)(1).

On November 3, 2009, the City denied approval of the Project.

The City’s findings are not consistent with Government Code section 65589.5, and the findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the record.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Violation of California Constitution and 42 U.S.C. 1983)

Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in this complaint, including, but not limited to, paragraphs 1 through 54, as though those allegations were set forth in full at this point.

Petitioner alleges that City’s actions described herein deprived Petitioner of their constitutional rights under the color of state laws. Petitioner alleges that Respondents and Defendants have violated Petitioner’s rights protected by article 1, section 7 of the California Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and 42 U.S.C. 1983 due to the actions of Carmel officials, including, but not limited to, the following:

a. Subjective Petitioner to a more than eight year processing of Petitioner’s application for the Project. Petitioner is informed and believes and thereupon alleges that this was done by the City to retaliate against Petitioner for Petitioner’s desire to demolish the existing former bank building even though the City Council stated the Project EIR did not have to address the demolition of the bank building in its November 7, 2006 findings and conclusions;

b. “Superceding” its November 7, 2006 findings that the former bank building demolition did not have to be addressed in the Project EIR and imposing new EIR requirements, particularly new alternatives and the “loss of great architecture” as a significant adverse impact which could not be mitigated even though there was no substantial evidence in the record to support such actions, and would not allow the demolition of the former bank building;

c. Imposing conditions on Petitioner’s property that are not imposed on similarly situated property in the City;

d. Denying Petitioner sufficient time to address public comments regarding the Project;

e. Filing a frivolous anti-SLAPP motion which was purely intended to harass and delay Petitioner;

f. Filing an opposition to a statutorily provided calendar preference of Petitioner’s appeal in order to delay and harass Petitioner;

g. Requiring review of a Project alternative (adaptive reuse) in December 2, 2009 even though that alternative was found in November 7, 2006 to be inappropriate and infeasible, and then taking almost a year to review that alternative; and

h. Demanding that the EIR be rewritten to add a specific adverse impact (proposed demolition of the former bank building would cause a “loss of great architecture”, resulting in a visual quality impact), which was not based upon any written City public policy, General Plan policy, regulation, zoning ordinance, resolution or any factual or city standard.

Carmel’s actions, as alleged in this Petition/Complaint, constitute a violation of Petitioner’s constitutional rights to equal protection. Carmel has adopted a practice of treating similar development applications differently, depending on who the applicant is. Petitioner is informed and believes and thereupon alleges that no other developer has been subjected to this treatment by Carmel. Even though Petitioner’s application is consistent with all of objective zoning ordinance and General Plan criteria and standards and previous Carmel actions, Carmel has failed to approve the Project during the more than eight years since its submittal were not consistent with City ordinances, its General Plan, and State law, and were not consistent with similar projects.

Carmel’s action show a differential treatment to Petitioner that raises a completely arbitrary classification with no rational basis, or wholly arbitrary, for this differential treatment.

By Carmel’s arbitrary, discriminatory, and wrongful acts herein described, Carmel has attempted to unreasonable prevent the planning for and development of the Project site. In so doing, Carmel has acted under the color of state law to treat Petitioner in a discriminatory and unfair and unequal manner as opposed to owners of comparable properties with development applications in Carmel, in violation of Petitioner’s state and federal constitutional and statutory rights.

By reasons of Carmel’s conduct, Petitioner was deprived of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by Petitioner by the state constitution, First, fifth, and Fourteen Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and the laws enacted thereunder in that Carmel’s actions were based on animus and ill will and were wholly arbitrary and irrational in imposing requirements on the Project which were not based on any written City policy, regulation, plan, ordinance, or resolution.

As a proximate result of Carmel’s actions against Petitioner as alleged above, Petitioner has been harmed and suffered damaged in the Petitioner has been subjected to monthly damages since December 2006 of $25,000 per month. Additionally, Petitioner has suffered humiliation and indignity, mental pain and suffering, and Petitioner has been prevented from transacting Petitioner’s business of development property in the City of Carmel-by-the-Sea, in an amount according to proof.

Carmel’s actions in depriving Petitioner of Petitioner’s state and federal protected constitutional rights were done with ill will, motive or intent, or with reckless or callous indifference to Petitioner’s rights.

Petitioner is informed and believes and theron alleges that Carmel will continue in Carmel’s unlawful conduct, unless and until restrained by this court. If Carmel is not restrained, as specified below, Petitioner will suffer immediate and irreparable injury, loss and damage in that Petitioner’s Project application will continue to be denied and subjected to illegal EIR requirements and misapplication of the HAA, and animus from Carmel.

By this cause of action, Petitioner seeks all legal and equitable relief to which Petitioner may be entitled, including, but not limited to, monetary damages, attorney’s fees and costs, prejudgment interest, and injunctive relief against Carmel.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Declaration Relief)

Petitioner alleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 64 as though allegations were set forth in full at this point.

Petitioner contends Carmel’s November 3, 2009 action was not lawfully adopted and is not consistent with procedural and substantive rights of the public, as these actions have damaged Petitioners and Petitioner’s property. Carmel also failed to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act, HAA, Government Code section 65915, and the previous Carmel November 7, 2006 findings concerning the Project.

An actual controversy subject to judicial review has arisen between Carmel and Petitioner. Petitioner is entitled to a judicial declaration of rights and responsibilities of the parties.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Injunctive Relief)

Petitioner alleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the complaint, including, but not limited to, paragraphs 1 through 67 hereof as though those allegations were set forth in full

Petitioner has no plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and unless this Court grants temporary and permanent relief, Petitioner will suffer irreparable harm, in that Carmel denied the Project based upon findings that are inconsistent with previous administrative record including HAA, Subdivision Map Act, and Government Code Section 65915.

If an injunction is not granted, damages would not afford adequate relief, in that they would not completely compensate for the injury to Petitioner’s business reputation and goodwill

Petitioner has no adequate remedy at law for the injuries currently being suffered because Carmel will continue to delay, harass, and harm Petitioner’s business reputation and goodwill.

WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests relief and pray for judgment as follows:
1. For an order directing the city of Carmel-by-the-Sea to set aside and void its November 3, 2009 actions;

2. That the court determine that the City of Carmel-by-the-Sea violated CEQA when it overruled the Petitioner’s appeal of the Plaza del Mar EIR;

3. For an order requiring the City of Carmel-by-the-Sea to comply with CEQA, the HAA, and various Government Code housing statutes by certifying the Project EIR without the specific adverse impact due to the “loss of great architecture”, and by approving Petitioner’s application for the Project, including all of their requested permits, and by granting Petitioner’s requested two incentives/concessions, within 60 days as required by Government Code section 65589.5(k), while the Court retains jurisdiction to ensure that the purposes and policies of Government Code section 65589.5 are fulfilled, including, but not limited to, an order to vacate Carmel’s November 3, 2009 decision as stated in this prayer;

4. For a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction restraining Respondents and Defendants from taking any action upholding the City’s November 3, 2009 action;

5. For a preemptory writ of mandate directing certification and approval of the Project EIR without the amendment to the Visual Quality section that found a specific adverse impact due to the “loss of great architecture” if the former bank building was demolished and also require approval of all of the Project’s permits;

6. For attorney’s fees under private attorney general stature, Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, and Government Code sections 65589.5 and 65915;

7. For general damages in an amount according to proof;

8. For damages, including fines as provided in Government Code section 65589.5, in an amount appropriate for Respondents’ and Defendants’ actions;

9. For reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988(b);

10. For costs of suit herein incurred;

11. A determination regarding the rights of the parties as follows:
a. That the existing Burde building on the site can be demolished;

b. That the Plaza del Mar EIR must be rewritten to revise the Visual Quality component to delete any reference to a significant adverse impact due to “loss of great architecture” that cannot be mitigated due to the demolition of the existing former bank building;

c. That the Plaza del Mar is a qualified housing development pursuant to Government Code sections 65589.5(h) and 65915(j);

d. That Carmel cannot make the findings required by Government Code section 65589(j) to deny the qualified housing development Project;

e. That even if “loss of great architecture” was a significant adverse impact that cannot be mitigated under CEQA, Carmel cannot deny the Project based on CEQA as the “specific adverse impact” due to the “loss of great architecture” resulting from the demolition of the former bank building does not meet the standard for “specific adverse impact” under Government Code section 65589.5(b),(d) and/or (j);

f. That Petitioner is entitled to two incentives/concessions, as permitted by Government Code section 66915;

g. That Petitioner is entitled to construct the Project in the most cost effective manner, as required by Government Code section 65583 and previous City Council findings and conclusions issued in November 7, 2006;

h. That Carmel must complete certification of the Project EIR, without the Visual Quality amendment due to “loss of great architecture,” and approve the Project and all of its development permits, including its demolition permit, within 60 days as required by Government Code section 65589.5(k), while the court retains jurisdiction to ensure that the purposes and policies of Government Code 65589.5 are fulfilled, including, but not limited to, an order to vacate Carmel’s November 3, 2009 decision to deny petitioner’s appeal and denial of all of the Project’s permits.

12. For declaratory relief that Carmel engaged in a pattern and practice of failing to comply with the requirements of the HAA, CEQA, and various Government Code sections intended to encourage housing in California, particularly affordable housing units; and

13. For such other and further relief as the Court deems appropriate.

Date: November 30, 2009

LOMBARDO & GILLES, LLP

By:
Dennis Beougher
Attorneys for Petitioners and Plaintiffs
John Mandurrago and Pacific Grove Land Company, LLC


Case No. M102802
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MONTEREY

JOHN MANDURRAGO and PACIFIC GROVE LAND COMPANY, LLC, Petitioners and Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA, CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA CITY COUNCIL and DOES 1-50, inclusive, Respondents and Defendants.

PETITIONERS’ OPENING BRIEF
Date Action Filed: December 3, 2009


The City has violated the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”), the Housing Accountability Act (“HAA”), and the Density Bonus and Other Incentives Law (“SDBL”).

II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1. Should the Court issue a writ where the City prejudicially abused its discretion by not proceeding in the manner required by law where the city:
• Violated the requirements of Government code section 65589.5 by its November 3, 2009 action;
• Violated the requirements of Government Code section 65915 by its November 3, 2009 action;
• Violated the requirements of CEQA;
• Issued a decision that was not supported by the findings; and
• Issued a decision with findings that are not supported by the evidence?

2. Did the City fail to comply with the requirements of the SDBL when it refused to grant the concessions/incentives requested by Petitioner, based upon substantial evidence, reflecting the requirements in Government Code section 65895.5(d)?

3. Did the City violate Petitioners’ protected state statutory non-discrimination rights provided in Government Code section 65008, by abusing its discretion and depriving Petitioners of their federal constitutional rights, as “class of one equal protection,” to due process and equal protection for which monetary damages are available as a remedy to enforce compliance with the statutory provisions, thereby preventing Petitioners from fully exercising their 5th and 14th Amendment rights?

4. Are Petitioners entitled to declaratory relief?

5. Are Petitioners entitled to injunctive relief?

LEGAL ARGUMENT:

A. THE COURT MUST ISSUE A PREEMPTORY WRIT AS THE CITY HAS PREJUDICIALLY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION

1. The City Violated The Requirements of the HAA
2. The City Violated the SDBL
3. The City Violated CEQA
4. The City’s Decision Is Not Supported By Its Findings, And the City’s Findings Are Not Supported by Substantial Evidence

B. THE CITY FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE HAA

C. THE CITY VIOLATED PETITIONERS’ UNITED STATES AND CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION PROTECTED RIGHTS

D. PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

CONCLUSION

The City’s lengthy period of unlawful actions, since at least December 2006, has denied at least two families the opportunity to reside in safe, decent and affordable housing in one of the most desirable places in the United States. For all of the above reasons, Petitioners respectfully request that the Court issue a peremptory writ of mandate compelling the city to set aside its denial of the Project and its certification of the Revised EIR, and that the Court award damages, and attorney’s fees to Petitioners as set forth in the Petition/Complaint prayer.

Dated: February 19, 2010
LOMBARDO & GILES
By: Dennis Beougher
Attorney for Petitioners/Plaintiffs

CASE No. M102802
RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF


LEGAL ARGUMENT
A. THE COURT MAY NEED TO DEFER ITS DECISION PENDING OUTCOME OF PETITIONER’S APPEAL

B. THE EIR ADEQUATELY SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF VQ-CONCERNING ARCHITECTURAL SIGNIFICANCE
1. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Do Not Apply
a. The Issues Between the Two Findings Were Not the Same

b. Administrative Res Judicata Does Not Apply to the Council’s Ongoing Findings Relating to the EIR Approval Process

2. The Administrative Record Fully Supports the City’s Findings of “Architectural Significance”
a. There Are Adequate Factual Foundations for the conclusion of Significance as to “Loss of Great Architecture.”

b. CEQA Does Not Require the Adoption of Specific Standards for Determining “Loss of Great Architecture”

C. THE CITY’S DENIAL BASED ON AESTHETIC ISSUES WAS A MATTER OF DISCRETION AND AN EXERCISE OF ITS POLICE POWERS

1. Design Review Determinations are a Discretionary Act.

2. Conditional Use Permit Decisions Are a Discretionary Act.

D.THE HOUSING ACCOUNTABILITY ACT DOES NOT PREEMPT OR PRECLUDE CEQA’S APPLICATION TO THE PROPOSED PROJECT.

1. The HAA is Subordinate to CEQA.

2. The Project Does Not Meet the Statutory Requirements of the HAA.
a. The Project Does Not Meet the Definition of a “Housing Development Project.”

b. Petitioners’ Do Not Meet the Statutory Requirements To Avail Themselves of the Protection of Govt. Code section 65589.5.

c. The Project Falls Within Two Statutory Exclusions to the HAA.

E. THE CITY HAS NOT VIOLATED THE SDBL
1. The Issue of Compliance with the SDBL is Premature Pending a Determination on the CEQA Issues.

2. The Petitioners’ Do Not Qualify for SDBL benefits.

F. PETITIONERS’ CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS SHOULD BE PROPERLY BIFURCATED FOR A TRIAL BY JURY

G. THE COURT SHOULD PROPERLY DEFER ANY DETERMINATION OF DELARATORY OR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.

Dated: April 6, 2010

KENNEDY, ARCHER & HARRAY
By: Richard K. Harray
W. Stuart Home, III
Attorneys for Defendant
CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA


Case No. M102802
PETITIONERS’ REPLY BRIEF

Date: June 9, 2010
Time: 1:30 p.m.
Dept: 15


ARGUMENT
A. The City Failed to Make Findings Consistent with Government Code Section 65889.5(j) When It Denied Petitioners’ Project

B. The Project Complies with the HAA
1. The Project Complies with the City’s General Plan/Zoning ordinance/LCP
a. The City’s Findings #4 and #14 Are Subjective General Plan Standards/Criteria, Not Objective Standards/Criteria

b. The Only Two Objective General Plan/Zoning Requirements Listed by City, Finding #5 (retaining two trees) and Finding #13 (Minimum Ratio of 1:1 Between Number of Rental and condominiums Units), Cannot Be the Basis for denial

2. The Project Meets the Definition of a Housing Development Under Government Code Section 65589.5(h)(B)

C. Even If Government Code Section 65589.5(i) Were the Standard,
the City Has Failed to Comply with This Standard by Its Alleged Compliance with the Two Statutory Exclusions to the HAA---Gov’t Code 65589.5(d)(3) or 65589.5(d)(5)(A).

1. Exemption Pursuant to Government Code Section 65589.5(d)(5)(A) Does Not Apply

2. Exemption Pursuant to Government Code Section 65589.5(d)(3) Is Not Applicable

D. The Record Does Not Support the City’s Assertion That the Project Must Be denied So As Not To Lose Great Architecture

1. Res Judicata/Collateral Estoppel Applies to the City’s November 2006 Findings And Decision

2. The Record Demonstrates that the City Did Not Consider the Bank Building to be “Great Architecture” Since the City Chose Not to Place It on the Carmel Inventory of Historic Resources

E. The City Violated the SCBL

F. The City Cannot Ignore the HAA

G. Petitioners’ Civil Rights Claims Have Been Properly Pled and Briefed

1. The Matter Should Not Be Bifurcated HAA

2. The Evidence Demonstrates Petitioners Were Treated Differently

3. Petitioners Were Not Responsible for the More than Eight Years Of Delays That the City When Created it Reviewed the Project

4. Petitioners’ California Constitutional Rights Were Also Violated

Dated: May 4, 2010

LOMBARDO & GILLES, LLP
BY: Dennis Beougher
Attorney for Petitioners John Mandurrago and Pacific Grove Land Company, LLC

Saturday, March 06, 2010

UPDATE: Historic Inventory Designation Appeals to the Historic Resources Board


Resource Name: W. A. Smith House
Location: Santa Fe St. 3 S.E. Mountain View Av.
Distinction: APPEAL GRANTED, one of many California Ranch House-style residences constructed in Carmel in the post-World War II era, the residence was determined to lack the degree of physical and architectural distinction necessary to meet the criterion for listing in the Carmel Historic Resource Inventory.

UPDATE: HISTORIC APPEALS TO THE HISTORIC RESOURCES BOARD
(November 2005 – January 2010)

APPEALS GRANTED: 45

APPEALS DENIED: 20

APPEALS DISMISSED: 14

APPEALS OF A PRELMINARY DETERMINATION OF INELIGIBILITY:

GRANTED: 1

DENIED: 3

TOTAL NUMBER OF APPEALS: 83

NUMBER ADDED TO REGISTER FROM INVENTORY: 1


HISTORIC APPEAL TO THE HISTORIC RESOURCES BOARD (January 25, 2010)
(Name of Property Owner, Physical Location, Resource Name, APPEAL GRANTED or DENIED)

HISTORIC RESOURCES BOARD
REGULAR MEETING AGENDA
Monday, January 25th, 2010
City Hall Council Chambers
East side of Monte Verde Street Between Ocean and Seventh Avenues

BOARD MEMBERS:
ERIK DYAR, CHAIRPERSON
ELINOR LAIOLO
ERLING LAGERHOLM
LAURA PRISHMONT QUIMBY
NICOLE SCHROEDER

APPEAL
Consideration of an appeal of the City’s determination to place an existing structure located in the Single Family Residential (R-1) District on the City’s Inventory of Historic Resources.

Name of Property Owner: Gary Wagner
Resource Name: W. A. Smith House
Location: Santa Fe St. 3 S.E. Mountain View Av.

APPEAL GRANTED

Thursday, April 16, 2009

SALE OF THE FLANDERS MANSION PROPERTY: Schedule of Public Hearings and Environmental & Economic Documents

ABSTRACT: The City of Carmel-by-the-Sea’s Schedule of Public Hearings on the Recirculated Final Environmental Impact Report for the Sale of the Flanders Mansion Property and the Economic Analysis is presented. Links to the full texts of the Recirculated Final ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT for the SALE OF THE FLANDERS MANSION PROPERTY (RFEIR), Recirculated Draft ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT for the SALE OF THE FLANDERS MANSION PROPERTY (RDEIR) and Flanders Mansion Economic Analysis are provided in an ADDENDUM.

CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA SCHEDULE OF PUBLIC HEARINGS ON THE SALE OF THE FLANDERS MANSION PROPERTY

SPECIAL FOREST AND BEACH MEETING APRIL 20 2009
Forest and Beach Commission April 20, 2009 @ 1:00 P.M.
Special Meeting: Special Meeting of the Forest and Beach Commission to discuss the Final Environmental Impact Report for the sale of the Flanders Mansion. The meeting will be held in the Council Chambers at City Hall, located on the east side of Monte Verde Street between Ocean and Seventh Avenues at 1:00 P.M.

SPECIAL HISTORIC RESOURCES BOARD MEETING APRIL 20 2009
Historic Resources Board April 20, 2009 @ 4:00 P.M.
Special Meeting: Special Meeting of the Historic Resources Board to discuss the Final Environmental Impact Report for the sale of the Flanders Mansion. The meeting will be held in the Council Chambers at City Hall, located on the east side of Monte Verde Street between Ocean and Seventh Avenues at 4:00 P.M.

SPECIAL PLANNING COMMISSION MEETING APRIL 23 2009
Planning Commission April 23, 2009 @ 4:30 P.M.
Special Meeting: Special Meeting of the Planning Commission to make recommendations to the City Council regarding the adequacy of the Final Environmental Impact Report for the sale of the Flanders Mansion. The meeting will be held in the Council Chambers at City Hall, located on the east side of Monte Verde Street between Ocean and Seventh Avenues at 4:30 P.M.

SPECIAL CITY COUNCIL MEETING APRIL 28 2009
City Council Meeting April 28, 2009 @ 4:30 P.M.
Special Meeting of the City Council to discuss the Final Environmental Impact Report and the Econmic Analysis for the sale of the Flanders Mansion. The meeting will be held in the Council Chambers at City Hall, located on the east side of Monte Verde Street between Ocean and Seventh Avenues at 4:30 P.M.

ADDENDUM:
Recirculated Final ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT for the SALE OF THE FLANDERS MANSION PROPERTY

RECIRCULATED DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT FOR THE SALE OF THE FLANDERS MANSION PROPERTY(RDEIR)

Flanders Mansion Property – Economic Feasibility Analysis

Sunday, March 15, 2009

UPDATE: Historic Inventory Designation Appeals to the Historic Resource Board

Resource Name: Robert Allen Griffin House
Location: Camino Real & 11th Av., S.W. Corner
Distinction: APPEAL GRANTED, Craftsman Cottage Residence removed from City’s Inventory of Historic Resources due to the absence of plans and lack of association with a master builder or architect.

UPDATE: HISTORIC APPEALS TO THE HISTORIC RESOURCES BOARD
(November 2005 – February 2009)


APPEALS GRANTED: 44

APPEALS DENIED: 20

APPEALS DISMISSED: 14

APPEALS OF A PRELMINARY DETERMINATION OF INELIGIBILITY:
GRANTED: 1
DENIED: 3

TOTAL NUMBER OF APPEALS: 82

NUMBER ADDED TO REGISTER FROM INVENTORY: 1

HISTORIC APPEAL TO THE HISTORIC RESOURCES BOARD (February 24, 2009)
(Name of Property Owner, Physical Location, Resource Name, APPEAL GRANTED or DENIED)

HISTORIC RESOURCES BOARD
REGULAR MEETING AGENDA
Monday, January 26th, 2009

City Hall Council Chambers
East side of Monte Verde Street Between Ocean and Seventh Avenues

BOARD MEMBERS:
ERIK DYAR, CHAIRPERSON
ELINOR LAIOLO
ERLING LAGERHOLM
NICOLE SCHROEDER
JULIE WENDT

APPEAL
Consideration of an appeal of the City’s determination to place an existing residence located in the Single Family Residential (R-1) District on the City’s Inventory of Historic Resources.

Name of Property Owner: The Edith Pomeroy Trust
Resource Name: Robert Allen Griffin House
Location: Camino Real & 11th Av., S.W. Corner
APPEAL GRANTED

Tuesday, June 24, 2008

UPDATE: Historic Appeals to the Historic Resources Board

Resource Name: Eva DeSabla House
Location: Santa Rita & 4th Av., S.W. Corner
Distinction: APPEAL GRANTED, Residence Removed from City’s Inventory of Historic Resources

UPDATE: HISTORIC APPEALS TO THE HISTORIC RESOURCES BOARD
(November 2005 – June 2008)


APPEALS GRANTED: 43

APPEALS DENIED: 20

APPEALS DISMISSED: 14

APPEALS OF A PRELMINARY DETERMINATION OF INELIGIBILITY:
GRANTED: 1
DENIED: 3

TOTAL NUMBER OF APPEALS: 81

NUMBER ADDED TO REGISTER FROM INVENTORY: 1

HISTORIC APPEAL TO THE HISTORIC RESOURCES BOARD (June 2008)
(Name of Property Owner, Physical Location, Resource Name, APPEAL GRANTED or DENIED)


CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA
HISTORIC RESOURCES BOARD
REGULAR MEETING AGENDA
Monday, June 16, 2008


I. CALL TO ORDER AND ROLL CALL
BOARD MEMBERS:
ERIK DYAR, CHAIRPERSON
ELINOR LAIOLO
ERLING LAGERHOLM
NICOLE SCHROEDER
JULIE WENDT

VII. APPEALS
Consideration of appeals of the City’s determination to place existing residences located in the Single Family Residential (R-1) District on the City’s Inventory of Historic Resources.

Name of Property Owner: Peter Bartowick
Resource Name: Eva DeSabla House
Location: Santa Rita & 4th Av., S.W. Corner
APPEAL GRANTED

Name of Property Owner: William Karges
Resource Name: Charles Eytinge House
Location: Camino Real & 7th Av., N.E. Corner
APPEAL GRANTED

Friday, February 15, 2008

UPDATE: HISTORIC APPEALS TO THE HISTORIC RESOURCES BOARD

Name: Robert W. Covington House
Location: Camino Real & 13th Av., N.E. Corner
Distinction: APPEAL GRANTED, Residence Removed from City’s Inventory of Historic Resources

UPDATE: HISTORIC APPEALS TO THE HISTORIC RESOURCES BOARD
(November 2005 – January 2008)


APPEALS GRANTED: 41

APPEALS DENIED: 20

APPEALS DISMISSED: 14

APPEALS OF A PRELMINARY DETERMINATION OF INELIGIBILITY:
GRANTED: 1
DENIED: 3

TOTAL NUMBER OF APPEALS: 79

NUMBER ADDED TO REGISTER FROM INVENTORY: 1

HISTORIC APPEAL TO THE HISTORIC RESOURCES BOARD (January 2008)
(Name of Property Owner, Physical Location, Resource Name, APPEAL GRANTED or DENIED)


CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA
HISTORIC RESOURCES BOARD
REGULAR MEEGING AGENDA
Monday, January 28th, 2008


BOARD MEMBERS:
ERIK DYAR, CHAIRPERSON
ELINOR LAIOLO
ERLING LAGERHOLM
NICOLE SCHROEDER
JULIE WENDT

VII. APPEALS
Consideration of an appeal of the City’s determination to place an existing residence located in the Single Family Residential (R-1) District on the City’s Inventory of Historic Resources.

Name of Property Owner: Winston Boyer
Resource Name: Robert W. Covington House
Location: Camino Real & 13th Av., N.E. Corner
APPEAL GRANTED

Sunday, December 23, 2007

UPDATE: Historic Designation Appeals to the Historic Resources Board

Resource Name: Ernest Bixler House
Location: Forest Rd & 7th Av, S.W. Corner
Distinction: APPEAL GRANTED, Residence Removed from City’s Inventory of Historic Resources

UPDATE: HISTORIC APPEALS TO THE HISTORIC RESOURCES BOARD
(November 2005 – December 2007)


APPEALS GRANTED: 40

APPEALS DENIED: 20

APPEALS DISMISSED: 14

APPEALS OF A PRELMINARY DETERMINATION OF INELIGIBILITY:
GRANTED: 1
DENIED: 3

TOTAL NUMBER OF APPEALS: 78

NUMBER ADDED TO REGISTER FROM INVENTORY: 1

HISTORIC APPEAL TO THE HISTORIC RESOURCES BOARD (December 2007)
(Name of Property Owner, Physical Location, Resource Name, APPEAL GRANTED or DENIED)

CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA
HISTORIC RESOURCES BOARD
REGULAR MEEGING AGENDA
Monday, December 17, 2007

BOARD MEMBERS:
ERIK DYAR, CHAIRPERSON
ELINOR LAIOLO
ERLING LAGERHOLM
NICOLE SCHROEDER (Absent)
JULIE WENDT

VII. APPEALS
Consideration of an appeal of the City’s determination to place an existing residence and detached garage located in the Single Family Residential (R-1) District on the City’s Inventory of Historic Resources.

Robert & Susan Neal
Resource Name: Ernest Bixler House
Location: Forest Rd & 7th Av. S.W. Corner
APPEAL GRANTED

Wednesday, December 12, 2007

Dysfunctional City Council Deliberations

ABSTRACT: At the 4 December 2007 City Council meeting, an agenda item on an appellant’s appeal of a Historic Resources Board decision to deny a request to remove a commercial property from the City’s Inventory of Historic Resources was heard by the City Council. Selected excerpts of City Council Members remarks from their deliberations are presented and Comments are made following each comment group. References of selected excerpts from the Agenda Item Summary and Staff Report are reproduced.

City Council Agenda
Regular Meeting
December 4, 2007


VIII. Public Hearings

If you challenge the nature of the proposed action in Court, you may be limited to raising only those issues you or someone else raised at the public hearing described in this notice, or in written correspondence delivered to the City Council at, or prior to, the public hearing.

A. Consideration of an appeal of the Historic Resources Board’s decision to deny a request to remove a property located on the northeast corner of Ocean and Dolores from the City’s Inventory of Historic Resources. The appellant and property owners are Theodore Leidig and Ocean and Sixth Ave. Investment, LTD.

Selected excerpts of the City Council deliberation, as follows:

• MAYOR SUE McCLOUD: I’m sort of lost...That really throws me for a loop.

• MAYOR SUE McCLOUD: You know, the word that’s sort of the catch phrase of the day is sustainable, we talk about sustainable energy and so forth and I think that’s also caught on and there have been some meetings recently where they talked about sustainable tourism. And when you look at that, you know, what is it that we have in Carmel that in the way that tourists come to see that is sustainable in their minds and one of them is our architecture. Much is made about the Carmel cottages, much is made about the Comstock, you know, dollhouses-type architecture and so forth. And the integrity of Ocean Avenue and the buildings that are there for the most part except for the change in the Carmel Plaza where the theatre was torn down, the lumberyard went away, the rest of it looks, you know, starting from the Carmel Diary and the milk bottle, as Earl mentioned, down that side and down the other side, it hasn’t changed dramatically at all. And I guess the concern that I would have is, is that, that is the key intersection, the hotel where Meta Bunse pointed to the sort of porch that came out, that’s the Carmel Hotel that was rolled down the street that became the Pine Inn and that was the, you know, the watering trough was there for the horses to water themselves. That was the center part of town. And that building, as I said, if Rip Van Winkle walked down the street, you know, he would recognize that building. And yes it can be destroyed. And if you took those down and put something else there, like right behind Pernille, where the gas station used to be, you know, you would have a very different feeling on Carmel and Ocean Avenue and our sustainable tourism or our architecture. And I think the integrity of our downtown is, would be really impacted by such a change. As much as I could say the same thing, Ted has been very generous to this town. And the family is long known. But, you know, Carmel Development Company is not as important to me as the fact that Carmel Drug has been there since the 30s and Village Hardware was there from the 1940s and the building on the corner, Sharper Image façade has changed the most just because the way it was when it was a market. But the framing of that, when you look at those pictures, it’s still the same to me. I just think that quite apart from taking the emotionalism out of it, it would change, if something is done to these buildings, because we’ve permitted them to be torn down, potentially, because they are no longer historic, we’re no longer protecting them, we will definitely change the ambience of out Central Commercial District.

COMMENT: As was evident after the City’s Staff Report, the issue before the City Council was whether the cumulative changes to the Carmel Development Company Building at the N.W. corner of Ocean Av. & San Carlos St. has resulted in a loss of substantial integrity so as to render the building not historic or has retained it’s integrity as a historic resource. Mayor McCloud’s non-germane, extraneous comments about “sustainable tourism,” architecture and the potential for demolition are typical. Comments should focus on the definition of “integrity” and whether the cumulative changes to the building represent a loss of substantial integrity or not.

• CITY COUNCIL MEMBER PAULA HAZDOVAC: It will be another mistake that we’ve made that, oh well, so what.

COMMENT: Hazdovac’s comment suggested that she is cognizant of other “mistakes” the City has made and the City’s cavalier attitude about their duties, responsibilities and accountability to the public.

• CITY ADMINISTRATOR RICH GUILLEN: You know, one of the concerns I have is there is a couple of things not answered here tonight. One is the second story. I don’t think you have all the facts to make a decision in that regard…So I’m just wondering if maybe staff should do a little more research on the second story issue…and bring it back next month.

CITY ATTORNEY DON FREEMAN: The only real issue left for the Council to decide is whether or not the cumulative changes over time have changed the integrity of the building...so really it doesn’t deal with second stories. You don’t have to worry about second stories. The only thing you haven’t had this evening is the City did have a consultant declare or suggest this was historic when it was placed on the list and you have not heard from that consultant…In a sense of fairness the City should ask that person to, and sort of, defend their position on why they did it because that is the person the City hired to do it. And you haven’t actually had that person before you this evening.

COMMENT: As City Attorney Don Freeman stated in response to City Administrator Rich Guillen’s comment about studying the second story issue, the real issue doesn’t deal with second stories. Again, the focus of the deliberations should be on “integrity,” not on second stories or other irrelevant issues.

• CITY COUNCIL MEMBER GERARD ROSE: ...a terrible precedent...that has never been done ever, to my knowledge, to these historic designations.

MAYOR SUE McCLOUD: Sean, was Mr. Seavey invited to come tonight?

SENIOR PLANNER SEAN CONROY: No.

MICHAEL ALBOV (representing Appellant Ted Leidig): I’m just a little surprised by the process. But, the Council can do whatever is wants and we recognize that, buts it’s a little weird.

COMMENT: For all of the previous historic appeals to the City Council, the City’s Preservation Consultant who evaluated and completed DPR 523 Forms for the properties on the City’s Inventory of Historic Resources was never present to defend or update his DPRs, et cetera. If the City was concerned about this appeal or changed its policy with respect to having the City’s consultant present to verbally review his findings and conclusions, then the City should have contacted the consultant and arranged in advance to have him at the City Council meeting.

• CITY ATTORNEY DON FREEMAN: You adopted the list in its entirety, but you could have gone through and limited it to those that you felt didn’t qualify because that’s what happens

CITY COUNCIL MEMBER GERARD ROSE: Well, we didn’t even adopt the list, not that way.

MAYOR SUE MCCLOUD: Well, it went forward with the LCP.

CITY ATTORNEY DON FREEMAN: It went forward with the LCP so the City Council actually did

CITY COUNCIL MEMBER GERARD ROSE: We recognized that it was a list, we didn’t adopt the list. That’s not correct.

CITY ATTORNEY DON FREEMAN: Well, it is, because it was adopted as

CITY COUNCIL MEMBER GERARD ROSE: I was there Don.

MAYOR SUE McCLOUD: Wait a minute.

CITY ATTORNEY DON FREEMAN: It was an attachment to the LCP and when you adopt the LCP you adopt all the attachments.

CITY COUNCIL MEMBER GERARD ROSE: No.

CITY ATTORNEY DON FREEMAN: Well, you do.

CITY COUNCIL MEMBER GERARD ROSE: No. That’s not what happened.

MAYOR SUE MCCLOUD: O.K. that’s enough…

CITY COUNCIL MEMBER GERARD ROSE: Oh, wait a minute Sue. Excuse me Sue.

MAYOR SUE McCLOUD: It went forward with the LCP. Let's not get

CITY COUNCIL MEMBER GERARD ROSE: I respectfully disagree, Sue, I mean, if you want to have your say that’s fine, let me have my say O.K. My say, I was there too and we didn’t adopt the list as such, we didn’t analyze any of the properties. All we did was recognize that there was a list out there. That’s all we did and we attached it as a list that’s out there. We did not adopt anything. That’s misleading and not true.

CITY ATTORNEY DON FREEMAN: I’m not suggesting you adopted the list on and by itself, all I’m saying is when you adopted the LCP that was an attachment that went with it.

CITY COUNCIL MEMBER GERARD ROSE: So what!

COMMENT: Although City Council Member Gerard Rose finally conceded the list (Inventory) was adopted by the City as an attachment to the LCP, his failure to take responsibility for his role in the adoption of the Inventory as part of the LCP is indicative of the City’s failure to exercise due diligence in reviewing the LCP prior to the City’s submittal to the California Coastal Commission for certification in late 2004.

• CITY COUNCIL MEMBER GERARD ROSE: ...At this late date, at this late time, to say O.K., because we obviously see we’re going to lose, let’s bring in Kent Seavey, I think that’s frankly, an unfair thing to do to the applicant and you know, I mean, if you get a majority that’s fine, but it’s an unfair thing to do, it sets a lousy precedent and frankly, it’s is kind of thing that makes us look foolish.

MAYOR SUE McCLOUD: Well, I would rather look foolish, Gerard, that not take the step so that we can be criticized in the future for not having heard all the evidence there was to hear from two different people.

HAZDOVAC made a substitute MOTION to CONTINUE the agenda item until Kent Seavey could appear before the City Council, seconded by McCLOUD and carried by the following roll call vote:
AYES: HAZDOVAC, SHARP, McCLOUD
NOES: ROSE, TALMAGE


COMMENT: On the one hand, Mayor Sue McCloud stated that there was no reason to delay a vote on the agenda item; on the other hand, McCloud stated she didn’t want to be criticized for “not having heard all the evidence there was to hear” from the two consultants, Kent Seavey and Meta Bunse, and voted to continue the agenda item. Furthermore, it is not a good precedent to appear to change policy during the historic appeal process; namely, the City has never had their historic consultant appear before the City Council during an appeal of a designated historic resource, only now to demand the presence of Kent Seavey in order to proceed with a City Council determination to grant or deny the appeal.

REFERENCES:
Selected excerpts from the Agenda Item Summary and Staff Report, as follows:

Meeting Date: 4 December 2007
Prepared by: Sean Conroy, Senior Planner
City Council
Agenda Item Summary

Name: Consideration of an appeal of the Historic Resources Board’s decision to deny a request to remove a property located on the northeast corner of Ocean and Dolores from the City’s Inventory of Historic Resources. The appellant and property owners are Theodore Leidig and Ocean and Sixth Ave. Investment, LTD. (Block 71, Lots 1-3, APN #’s 010-134-004/011).

Description: The appellant seeks removal of the property from the City’s Inventory of Historic Resources. Approval of the appeal would overturn a decision of the Historic Resources Board and result in the removal of the property from the list.

Staff Recommendation: Grant the appeal.

Important Considerations: The subject property has been included on the City's Inventory of Historic Resources that was adopted as part of the Local Coastal Program in 2004.

CMC 17.32.070 states that a property identified as an historic resource on the Carmel Inventory shall be presumed historically significant and shall not be removed from the City’s Inventory unless substantial evidence demonstrates that it is not an historic resource.

Decision Record: The Historic Resources Board denied the request to remove the property from the City’s Inventory of Historic Resources on 22 October 2007. The property owner filed an appeal with the City Clerk on 1 November 2007.


CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA
STAFF REPORT
TO: MAYOR McCLOUD AND COUNCIL MEMBERS
THROUGH: RICH GUILLEN, CITY ADMINISTRATOR
FROM: SEAN CONROY, SENIOR PLANNER
DATE: 4 DECEMBER 2007
SUBJECT: CONSIDERATION OF AN APPEAL OF THE HISTORIC RESOURCES BOARD’S DECISION TO DENY A REQUEST TO REMOVE A PROPERTY LOCATED IN THE CENTRAL COMMERCIAL (CC) DISTRICT FROM THE CITY’S INVENTORY OF HISTORIC RESOURCES. THE APPELLANT AND PROPERTY OWNERS ARE THEODORE LEIDIG & OCEAN AND SIXTH AVE INVESTMENT LTD. (NE COR. OCEAN & DOLORES, BLK 71, LOTS 1-3, APN #’S 010-134-004/011).

SUMMARY RECOMMENDATION
Grant the appeal.

BACKGROUND & PROJECT DESCRIPTION
The structure subject to this appeal is a one-story concrete block building with three bays and is located on the northwest corner of Ocean Avenue and San Carlos Street. The building was originally constructed in approximately 1902. A fourth bay was constructed to the west in 1923 but is not considered historic. Mr. Leidig owns the two eastern most bays, while the bay occupied by the Carmel Drug Store is owned by Ocean and Sixth Ave Investment LTD.

The property was identified as an historic resource as part of the City’s on-going survey of historic structures. The DPR indicates that the structure qualifies as an historic resource under California Criterion #1 (history) as the first and oldest commercial business block, and under California Criterion #3 (architecture) for its use of “fireproof” concrete block construction. The DPR indicates that the property relates to the Architectural Development and Economic Development themes of the City’s Historic Context Statement.

The Historic Resources Board denied this appeal on 22 October 2007.

Basis for Appeal: The appellant is requesting that the property be removed from the City’s Inventory of Historic Resources for the following reason:
1) Due to extensive additions and alterations, the property does not retain sufficient integrity to qualify as significant under Criterion 1 and/or 3.

California Register Criteria: CMC 17.32.040 indicates that historic properties must relate to at least one of the California Register Criteria. The original DPR indicates that the property qualifies under Criterion #1 and Criterion #3. These criteria are listed below:

1) It is associated with events that have made a significant contribution to the broad patterms of local or regional history, or the cultural heritage of California or the United States.

3) It embodies the distinctive characteristics of a type, period, region, or method of construction, or represents the work of a master or possesses high artistic values.

Integrity: CMC 17.32.040 indicates that historic properties must maintain substantial integrity. The appellant points out that numerous changes have taken place over the years including expansion of a fourth bay on the west of the building in 1923, two additions to the north of the structure in 1957, several store front alterations including changes to the transom windows above the storefront windows, and the installation of three new windows on the east elevation in 1989.

However, the window additions, combined with the other alterations have caused the property to lose its integrity.

HRB Review: The HRB denied this appeal on 22 October 2007. The Board strongly recommended that the Council have a third review performed by another professional historian before making a final decision on the property. This was based on the fact that there were two competing historic reports. The Board’s final decision was based on the following points:

• The property qualifies as historic under California Register Criterion #1 for its association with the Carmel Development Company and as the first commercial building block constructed in the City.

• The property qualifies as historic under California Register Criterion #3 for its use of innovative construction materials, fireproof blocks.

• The property has not been altered so drastically as to make it unrecognizable to someone who was familiar with the building when it was originally constructed.

• The additions and alterations have not caused the property to lose its historic integrity.

RECOMMENDATION:
Grant the appeal.

NOTES:
Meta Bunse, JRP Historical Consulting, DPR 523, 16 pages, 2006.

Kent L. Seavey, Preservation Consultant, DPR 523, 3 pages, 2003.