https://drive.google.com/file/d/181i9MENm7jxep3HOHZ7uNLdINPReuhtd/view?usp=sharing
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA
GARLAND FAVORITO, MICHAEL SCUPIN, TREVOR TERRIS, SEAN DRAIME, CAROLINE JEFFORDS, STACEY DORAN,
CHRISTOPHER PECK, ROBIN SOTIR, and BRANDI TAYLOR Petitioners,
vs.
FULTON COUNTY, ALEX WAN, VERNETTA KEITH NURIDDIN, KATHLEEN RUTH, AARON JOHNSON, AND MARK W
INGATE in their individual capacities, Respondents.
CIVIL ACTION FILE N0.: 2020CV343938
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
An injury is particularized when it “affects the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Wood v. Raflensperger, 981 F.3d 1307, 1314 (11th Cir. 2020) (internal citations and styling omitted). Petitioners” allegations are, in sum, that their state equal protection and due process rights were violated because their votes, and the votes of other Georgia voters, were diluted as a result of the inclusion of fraudulent ballots that were counted because Respondents negligently oversaw the ballot processing for the General Election.
The 11th Circuit in Wood found substantially similar allegations of voter dilution insufficient to confer standing. Wood, the appellant, alleged that “irregularities in the hand recount violated his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 1312. He asserted he had basis for standing because “the inclusion of unlawfully processed absentee ballots diluted the weight of his vote.” Id. at 1314.
The 11th Circuit, in a unanimous opinion written by Chief Judge William Pryor, disagreed. Although it recognized that vote dilution could be a basis for standing, such as in malapportionment and gerrymandering cases, the 11th Circuit also noted that these cases typically required the plaintiffs to be compared to another group of voters. Id. at 1314 (“[V]ote dilution occurs when voters are harmed compared to ‘irrationally favored’ voters from other districts”). “By contrast, no single voter is specifically disadvantaged if a vote is counted improperly, even if the error might have a mathematical impact on the final tally and thus on the proportional effect of every vote.” Id. (citing Bognet v. Sec ’y Commonwealth 0fPa., 980 F.3d 336, 356 (3d Cir. Nov. 13, 2020), cert. granted, judgment vacated by Bognet v. Degraflenreid, 2021 WL 1520777 (Apr. 19, 2021) with instructions to dismiss case as moot) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, the llth Circuit found Wood had alleged only a generalized grievance. Id at 1314-15.
Other cases that have tangled with the issue of vote dilution in this context have concluded similarly. See Bowey v. Ducey, 506 F.Supp.3d 699, 711-12 (D. Az. Dec. 9, 2020) (finding that theory of vote dilution as a result of alleged voting fraud and manipulation does not confer standing); Moore v. Circosta, 494 F.Supp.3d 289, 3l2~13 (M.D.N.C. Oct. l4, 2020) (finding that possibility of unlawful ballots being counted is insufficient to have standing to bring vote dilution claims under the federal equal protection clause); Martel v. Condos, 487 F.Supp.3d 247, 254 (D. Ver. Sept. 16, 2020) (stating possible vote dilution caused by hypothetical “third— party’s fraudulent vote” is generalized injury).
Here, Petitioners allege a basis for standing similar to that asserted in Wood. However, as in Wood, Petitioners’ arguments are not enough to give rise to a particularized injury. Vote dilution as a result of allegedly unlawfully processed ballots is “a paradigmatic generalized grievance.” Wood, at 1315 (citation omitted). See also Paher v. Cegavske, 457 F.Supp.3d 919, 926 (D. Nev. Apr. 30, 2020) (“But Plaintiffs’ purported injury of having their votes diluted due to ostensible election fraud may be conceivably raised by any Nevada voter. Such claimed injury therefore does not satisfy the requirement that Plaintiffs must state a concrete and particularized injury”). “[A] generalized grievance, no matter how sincere, cannot support standing.” Wood, at 1314 (citing Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 706 (2013)) (internal quotations omitted).
Accordingly, the Court concludes the Petitioners have not alleged a particularized injury, and therefore, do not have standing.“
Having considered the evidence submitted, the arguments of counsel, and the record as a whole in the light most favorable to Petitioners, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion to dismiss by Respondents Alex Wan, Vernetta Nuriddin, and Aaron Johnson is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, due to the similar lack of standing, the claims against Respondents Kathleen Ruth and Mark Wingate be, and hereby are, also DISMISSED.”
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, because the Court’s final order on April 20, 2021 fully adjudged Petitioners’ ORA claims, no further relief may be accorded to Petitioners under the ORA, and therefore, Respondent Fulton County is also DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED this 13TH October 2021.
Brian J. Amero, Chief Judge
Superior Court of Henry County
Flint Judicial Circuit
By Designation, a Fulton County
Superior Court Judge
No comments:
Post a Comment